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ORTHODOXY AND THE NEW RUSSIA
Jonathan Clarke and Duncan Reid
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Crosss. ed.

2004) 3-20.

This paper examines the contempormy phenomenon of the re

emergence of the Orthodox Church

not only as the

leading religious

institution of post-Soviet Russia, but also as a core marker of identity. The
disappearance of the Soviet Union has produced a profound crisis of idemity
in Russia. Traditional markers of identity, particularly the Orthodox Church,
have assumed an importance hardly anticipated before the collapse of the
USSR.

The demise of the Soviet Union was one of the cataclysmic events of the late
twentieth century. Hardly predicted even a few years before it occurred, it ushered in a new
chapter in the long and turbulent history of Russia.' But the new sovereign state that emerged
as the Russian Federation (Rossiiskaiafederatsiia) remains an enigma for many observers: it
appears to share significant characteristics of Western countries while displaying unexpected
and prominent features that set it apart. One of these distinguishing features is a widespread
devotion to religion that finds its expression in the Orthodox Ch\lrch.

1

In the paper that

The same can bes.aid mutati_y muumdis ofthe other independent states that appeared on the territory of

the fol'lner Soviet U1li01l after Lhe collapse of the USSR. There is no suggestion that Russia and the Soviet Union
should be considered coterminous.
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follows we shall examine the phenomenon of contemporary Orthodoxy and the reasons for its
re-emergence an important marker of Russian identity in the post-Soviet period.
Axiomatic to our argument is the understanding of religious doctrine enunciated by
the American Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck. Doctrines, he says, function primarily
'nor as expressive symbols or truth claims, but as communally authoritative rules of
discourse, attitude and action'.'

Religion is thus to be understood as a cultural-linguistic

phenomenon, and 'like a culture or language it is a communal phenomenon that shapes the
subjectivitics

of

individuals

rather

than

being

primarily

a

manifestation

of

these

subjectivitics'.3 There is thus an intuitive sense of how to be religious that is learned in the
way children Jearn their own mother tongue. To learn this as an adult requires learning the
doctrinal 'grammar', and the practice is never quite as natural and unstudied as the practice of
the child or the one who has learnt a� a child. The Orthodox Church in contemporary Russia
has three or four generations to catechise who have not leamt their own doctrinal language in
this immediate and artless way. It would be a mistake for western observers to underestimate
the difficulty of this task, or to presume to assess or judge the Russian Orthodox Church
without some attempt themselves to enter this intuitive dimension of what is or is not
appropriate speech or behaviour. Lindbeck was thus able to foresee the present catechetical
task of the Russian 01thodox Church in the post-Soviet context in which large numbers of
people seek something to fill the

'moral vacuum'' of post-Soviet Russia: 'to become

religious ... is to interiorize a set of skills by practice and training.... The primary knowledge
is not about the religion, nor that the religion teaches such and such, but rather how to be
,
religious in such and such ways _s

The Place of Orthodox Christianity in Russian Culture
The current prominence of the Orthodox Church is not entirely new. The church has
long held a special place in the religious and cultural life of Russia. It has been a rich source
of spirituality and has had a deep influence on creativity of all kinds: literature, music, art,

2

George Lindbeck, The Noture ofDoclrine: religion andrheology

Westminster Press, 1984),

t8.

in a post liberal oge (J)hiladelphia

:

' Lindbeck,33.

4 Leslie Holmes, Po.�t-Commrmism: an introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997) 5. For the efe
f cts of

this moral

vacuum,

sec S. f-landelman,

Comrt1dr1 Crimino/:

The Theft ofthe Se,·ond Russian Re"'vlution (London:

Michael Joseph,J994); and M. Brzezinski, CaslnoMoscow: A TalcofGrecdand Adwntureon Capitalism:,·

Fronrier(Ncw York; Free Press. 2001).

Wildest

'Lindbeck. 35.
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architecture, philosophy and political thought.4

At various times the leading role of the

church in Russia has been contested and is onee more the subjeet of public debate.

But

whether the reaction to Orthodoxy is positive or negative, it remains a powerful cultural
detenninant.
It is clear that Onhodoxy has left a concrete legacy in the Russian language:

the

Cyoillic alphabet and much of the abstract vocabulary, even ceotain grammatical forms, can
be traced back to Church Slavonic. The very idea of literacy is associated directly with the
missionary activity of the church.

Such a close historical connection between literacy and

Orthodoxy has impootant implications for the way in which national identiry may be
constnlcted. And it differs radically from the history of literacy in the West where the Roman
alphabet predated the conversion to Christianity.
Russian literature can also be shown to bear a strong Orthodox imprint. At a rather
simple level it is possible to point to the large number o f Russian writers who have dealt
explicitly with religious questions or been interested in such matters.

Dostoevsky comes

immediately to mind as an outstanding example, but even an apparently secular author such
as Chekhov wrote a remarkable short stooy with a religious theme, Sllldem ('The Student').
So numerous are the Russian

writers7 who have been preoccupied with problems of

spirituality that it is difficult to find comparable national literature i n Europe that has treated
spiritual themes so extensively. The same may be said of Russian philosophers.' If one seeks
an explanation for this phenomenon, then it is possible to sunnisc that it reflects the relatively
late secularization of Russia compared with Western Europe and demonstrates the prolonged
influence of the church as the major cultural institution in society.
In general one can argue that there can be no comprehension of Russian literary
culture without an appreciation of the profound intluence of Orthodoxy on Russian writers
and thinkers. Whether these writers have embraced Orthodoxy or rejected it in some way, it
represents the conceptual foundation of the Russian culture.

This is not to say that all

Russian writers can be described as Orthodox or anti-0rthodox in a simple sectarian sense,

f> Orlando Figes,Natasha's Dam
..
:
e
· : A CuiJUral Hsto
i
ry ofRussia (London: Penguin, 2003).
1 We could also mention Tolstoy, Gogol', and Lcskov, as well as 20th cenn1ry writers like Bulgakov,

Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn.

' See Frederick Copleston, Philosophy in Russ iajiwn Herzen 10 Lenin and Berdyaev (Tunbridge Wells,

UK: Search Press. 1986): Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Martha

Bohhchchcvsky-Chomiak (cds),A Revolution ofthe

Spirit: Crisis q(Value in Russia. 1890·1924 (New York: Fordham Univ Press, 1990); Judilh Komblatl
Gustafson(eds), RussianReligious Thought(Madison: Univ. ofWisconsin Press,

and

R.

L996); and B. P. Vysheslavtsev, The

Etenwl in Russian Philosophy. translated by Penelope V. Bun (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
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but rather that their cultural milieu has been so imbued with Orthodoxy that it cannot be
understood apart from it.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation

the official government view of religion in Russia has been strictly secular.

Not even a

passing reference to God is made in the Constitution or the Preamble, and there is certainly
no provision for an established church. The Constitution demands the absolute separation of
church and state.

Yet despite these constraints the Orthodox Church has become a vital

component of Russian life and its prominent position has been much discussed.
The consideration of religion, and specifically of Russian Orthodoxy, does not
however play a prominent part in many recent assessments of the new Russia. The Austra.lian
political scientist Leslie Holmes, for example, in a major introduction to post-communist
Eastern Europe, makes very few references to the role of religion. The references he does

make see religion

as

filling the already mentioned ·moral vacuum'' left by the demise of

communism, and as representing a temporary process of 'retraditionalisation'10 that can be
expected to decrease as Eastern Europe becomes increasingly integrated into the world
community, especially through travel. He sees some deplorable elements in the re-emergence

of religion, as 'greater tolerance by the state has in some cases been accompanied by greater
intolerance by citizens, who use religious differences as a pretext for open conflict with their
neighbors'

.

11

But this last statement is also a reason to take religion very seriously as a

component, and more likely than not an enduring component, in the emerging Russian
national identity.
At. the same time it should be noted th11t even commentators who have attempted an
objective and critical account of religion in the new Russia, while taking a firm stand on the
need for a secular state, have come to acknowledge that the leading role of Orthodoxy in the
search for identity is to be fully expected. As Alexander Agadjaoian writes:
This enlisting of Orthodoxy in the shaping of the ·new nation' seems natural
in Russia (if we take as our starting point the criteria (for the dialectical
relationship between the identity of contemporary nations and religion) set
out in the introduction), given its dominant position and clear links with a
dominant ethnos.'2

•

llolmes, $.

•• Holmes. 280

11

Holmes, 278.
•: Alexander AgadJan•an. 'Religious plurnlism and n:ulooal identity 1n Russia'. MOST Journal
AfulllculmrolSocielies. Vot.2, No.2,2001, 15. available Dl hnp://www.unesco.org/moslfvl2n2au;o_cn.htm
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If contemporary Russia cannot be adequately understood without acknowledgement
of the role of religion, and specifically Otthodoxy within the new Russia, it is equally
important that an understanding of Russian Orthodoxy itself be informed by an appropriate
feel for the nuances of the Orthodox worldview and piety. As a corollary, a failure at either
level - in the acknowledgement of the place of Orthodoxy, or in the appropriate apprehension
of its worldview and piety - will lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the new
Russia. Andreas Buss offers a number of past misinterpretations of Orthodoxy
consequent

misunderstandings

of

Russia

misunderstandings may reassert themselves.

itself,

and

the

danger

is

that

such

and
past

Some examples given by Buss are a failure to

understand differing notions of sovereignty operating in Russia in the 19"' century," a failure
of understanding that interpreted the 17'" century schism as a sott of eastern Protestantism,"
and perhaps most fundamentally, an inappropriate nominalist gloss on traditional Russian
communalism which, Buss argues, should be understood in a far more realist (in the
mediaeval sense) fashion.'5
Assessments of the new Russia, and emerging national identity in this new context,
cannot afford to overlook the religious element or to dismiss it as a passing phase. Rosenthal
and Bohachevsky-Chomiak nOte the re-emergence of the religious philosophies of the late
19" century in Russian intellect1 tal life. from the 1970s onward. 16 Agadjanian tt-accs the post
Soviet religious resurgence to a larger social and culrural change beginning as early as the
1
1960s. 1 It may well be that 'retraditionalisation' will fade into the background in time,
obscuring but not fi.mdamentally changing or replacing the underlying elements of Orthodox
world view and piety. It would be a mistake, for example, to consider the Orthodox Church as
little more than a political player, or assume that because the Russian Federation has adopted
a modern secular constirution that this accurately describes the national identity of its people.
It may also be a mistake to consider the role of Orthodoxy in the new Russia as simply the
equivalent of

western, especially American, 'civic

religion' characterised by religious

behaviour of an essentially tolerant, lowest-common-denominator variety. I$

n

Arldrcas Buss. The Russian-Orthodo.r Tr(ldition ond Modemity(Lcidcn & Boslon: Brill, 2003),

" Buss, I 17 ff.

1680:

•s Bus..c;� 22.

16 Rosenthal and Bohhchchevsky-Chomiak., vii.

11 Alexander Ag�djanian, 'Revising Pandora's Gifts: Religious and national lde.mity in the Post-Soviet

Societal Ft1bric\ in Europe-Asia Studies, 53/3, 200 I, 473.
13 Agadjanian, 'Revising Pandorn's Gifts', 482.
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The Construction of Identity In

tbc New Russia

During the Soviet period a single ideology determined a particular concept of the
nation, at that time constituted as the USSR. By contrast, in the post-Soviet period various
sets of ideas have competed for dominance and the notion of Russia has been fiercely
contested. It is a debate that is characterized by high emotion and intellectual virtuosity, but
hardly corresponds to current public arguments in the West.

It differs both in style and

content. Tbe issues involved are felt to be profoundly important and are often expressed as
matters of existential significance.
When the Soviet Union disappeared and newly independent states were created in
place of the constituent republics o f the USSR, the experience of national independence was
not the same in all the new sovereign states. For most countries the experience was a positive
one of liberation from what was perceived to be an oppressive regime that stifled national
aspirations. In the case of Russia the experience was ve•y different. Ce1tainly Russia became
an independent sovereign state, but it also experienced a significant sense of loss. This was
the loss of prestige and political influence that had been enjoyed when Russia and the Soviet
Unioo had been closely identified with each other, certainly in the minds of many Russians.

After all, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had been by far the largest
and most populous of the Soviet republics, the Russian language had served as the lingua
franca of the USSR, and Moscow had been its capital.

So the conflation of Russia with the

USSR, while not strictly accurate, was strongly embedded in popular thinking and was
retlected at the lexical level in the common use of Rossiia or Russia to refer to the Soviet
Union. The misconception that this entailed may be important in an academic sense, but does
not diminish the psychological significance of the identification of Russia with the Soviet
Union for the constmction of the concept of the nation. Nor should the disappearance of the
Soviet Union be underestimated as a factor contributing to widespread anxiety in Russia
about the country's place in the world. This situation would seem to reflect a deep crisis of
identity induced by the demise o f the Soviet Union and the passing of a clearly defined notion
of what constitutes the nation. The current debate about identity in Russia is therefore driven
by the pressing need to re-invent the nation.
What may be termed the official contempomry view of the nation is expressed in the
Constitution of the Russian Federation. This is a model secular Constitution that eschews the
rhetoric of nationalism and acknowledges Russia's place in the world community. It defines
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the nation in strictly constitutional tcnns as a democratic state govemed by the mle of law in
which power is vested in the people and all citizens have equal rights irrespective of their
ethnicity.

Such a view finds corresponding expression at the level of the lexicon in the

deliberate and precise juxtaposition of the adjectives
denoting national and ethnic identity.••

rossiiskii

and russkii as distinct tenns

Even the Preamble to the Constitution avoids

refe1·ences to the glories of the past, but stresses the principles that should infonn the present
and the future. It affirms the multiethnic character of the population by describing the people
of Russia as mnogonacional'nyi.
This official view of the nation depends for general support in Russia on widespread
acceptance of the Constitution and the polity it defines as markers of national identity.
the Constitution lacks popular appeal and its status has been undermined.

Yet

The previous

Constitution of the USSR was seen by many as failing to guarantee the lawful conduct of
political affairs, while in post-Soviet Russia there is also a widely held view of a discrepancy
between tbe functioning of the political system and the requirements of the Constitution.
If the Constitution does not serve as a strong marker of national identity in Russia,
then the quest for identity will encourage other markers to take its place.

And there is a

tendency for traditional markers of identity to emerge as substitutes, since they arc already
well-established as powerful labels of self-definition and have an emotional appeal and the
weight of tradition that the recently written Constitution does not.

Such a marker is the

Orthodox faith.

Orthodoxy as a Marker or Identity
But while 01thodoxy functions as an important identity marker in this construction, it
does not mean that it is confined to this role or that this role adequately represents it. There
are

significant doctrines of Orthodoxy that make claims to universality and that transcend

notions of national and ethnic identity.

Some within the Onhodox Church prefer to stress

these doctrines, while others arc more inclined to emphasize its national importance. It is too
simple to see the role of 01thodoxy simply in tenns either of idealist universalism or of
(political) realism as a badge of identity giving rise to intolerance.
The official view of the church proclaims its universal and supranational character.
While also encouraging national loyalty, the church affirms the equality of all peoples and the
1"' 'Illis is discussed in greate1· detail by Jonathon Clarke. 'Language and the Construction of Jdentity in

Russia' CERC,

Working l'apers Series,

no.l/2005.
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subordination of the state to God. This dual emphasis is expressed in the words of the official
website of the Moscow Patriarchate:
By

its

very

nan1re

the

Church

has

a

universal

and,

consequently,

supranational character. In the Church 'there is no distinction between Jew
and Greek' [Rom.IO.J2]. ...
However, the universal character of the Church does not mean that Christians
should not

have the

right to national independence,

to national

self

expression. On the contrary, the Church combines a universal origin with a
national one.

Thus, the Orthodox Church, while universal, consists of a

multitude

Autocephalous

of

Local

Churches.

Orthodox

Christians,

acknowledging that they are citizens of a heavenly country, ought not to
forget about their earthly homeland . ...
Contrary to Orthodox ethics is the division of peoples into superior and
inferior, the belittling

of

any ethnic

or civil nation.

All the

more

incompatible with Orthodoxy are docn·ines which put the nation in the place
'D
of God or reduce faith to one of the aspects of national consciousness.
If one seeks an explanation for the prominence of Orthodoxy in this construction of national
identity, then it should be remembered that the Orthodox Church represents one of the very
few public institutions from pre-revolutionary Russia that has survived the cataclysm of the
Soviet period and

continues t o exist

disappearance of the USSR.

in the post-Soviet state

that emerged after the

In a country where the political structures have been subjected

to two major social revolutions in less than eighty years, and where the polity has been
fundamentally altered as a result, the church offers continuity with the past and a powerful
means of self-definition.
But what Orthodoxy provides in contemporary Russia is a sense of meaning that is
difficult to derive simply from the political and economic system. It offers a coherent view of
the world that clearly defines the place of the individual and affirms human identity as the
image of God.

"

Orthodoxy imparts value to the nation through its long and close association

with Russian culture and history.

Because it has endured the trials of the Soviet period i t

remains a symbol o f continuity.

At a time when the search for identity in Russia is so

pressing, the concepn•al framework of Orthodoxy has enom1ous intellectual and emotional
appeal.

Hl

at
From
the
official
website
of the
Moscow
Patriarchnre,
available
http://www.mospat.rultext/conception/id/50.htn'll
21
'Man is considered to be the highest exp•·ession ofGod's creative pi'Ocess, while God is regarded as the
absolmevalue. the u ltimate criterion oftruth for all living creatures.' (Bishop Hilario n Alfeyev, 'Christianity and the
Challenge ofMilirant Sec.ulariSI'I\' Paper read at the Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Association of
11leologic�l Schools, 5-8 July 2004. Melbourne, I.
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Tite strength of this appeal is not hard to demonstrate.

It is reflected in the

programme of a political patty like the Christian Democratic Party of Russia

Khrisliansko-Demokratid!skaia par!'ia) that

(Rossiiskaia

shows the same reliance on the Orthodox view

of h umanity in relation to God:
The permanent Christian value and basic principle of Christian democracy is

the freedom and sovereignty of the human individual as the image and

likeness of God. The lawful social s tate, whose basis is a humane democratic

constitution, must become the chief guarantor of th e free development both
of the individual and of the society as a whole.u
References to Orthodoxy abound i.o the press and even rep resentatives of Russian
popular culture articulate their devot ion to Orthodoxy as a source of inspiration and renewal.

As the rock musician Konstantin Kinche v stated forcefully in an interview published in 1997:
Well, to speak now of culture in general is terrible.

In as much as precisely

what constituted the cultural wealth of Russia was being destroyed for
seventy years.

fundamental.

But, nevertheless, even today culture exists - in everything
The

Orthodox

Church

exists,

and

there

are

creative

personalities that understand the necessity of a Christian renaissancc.23
To this w e could add the rece nt statement by Pt·csidcnt Vladimir Putin on his visit to
Mt Athos that the revival of faith was the foundation of the current rebirth of Russia, and that
he welcomed the restoration of the historic relations between the Holy Mountain and the
Russian state- relations that 'should be harmonious and based on absolute trust and common
spiritunl ideals'.2' It is the nature of these 'common spiritual ideals' and this 'Christian

renaissance' i n Russia that needs S)�n\)athetic but nO\ uncritica\ theo\o<&ica\ exl!\otation.

available at www.oha.ru/-rcdpllm-aims.htm
Literatumojoga:etu. IS Jonuary, 1997, No 1-2. 14.
"Cited in Europau:o. N. 75 (October 2005 ) available at : hl!p:lfwww.onbodoxeurope.o'l!f
u See the Pony's Programme (on Russian),

»
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